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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the role of the institutional framework for the labour
market performance in EU countries. The point of departure is the labour
demand equation that is derived from cost minimization behaviour of firms.
Labour demand is expressed by its structural parameters, i.e. the output and
real wage elasticity. Cointegration relationships between employment, output
and wages are revealed by efficient estimation techniques. The long run param-
eters are explained by indicators for product and labour market institutions
using panel fixed effects models. The results suggest that higher flexibility in the
product and labour markets could be a strategy to improve the employment
record. The response of employment to macroeconomic conditions is stronger in
a more deregulated environment, and the absorption of shocks can be relieved.
1. INTRODUCTION
THE RISING INTEGRATION OF MARKETS and the introduction of the euro hasintensified competition in many European countries. Companies are lessable to raise prices, and income that could be allocated in wage bar-
gaining is reduced. Advances in competition are accompanied by the sup-
pression of transaction costs, declining information costs and uncertainty. On
the macroeconomic side, higher price stability achieved by the European
Central Bank and the resizing of the public sector by the Stability and Growth
Pact can create conditions for higher growth and employment. On the other
hand, the loss of competence in terms of nominal exchange rates, the cen-
tralisation of monetary policy, and fewer opportunities for independent fiscal
policies limit the capacity to react against adverse shocks. In this environ-
ment, labour markets have to bear a larger role in the adjustment process.
Nevertheless, European labour markets have shown a weak performance over
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the last decades. Unemployment is still at high levels and persistent. For
example, 50 per cent of the unemployed in the large euro area countries
(Germany, France, Italy) are long term unemployed, i.e. they have been out of
the labour market for more than one year. Significant barriers to re-enter the
labour market seem to exist once a job is lost. Participation in the labour force
is quite low. Employment rates fluctuate around 65 per cent, not far below the
Lisbon goal (70 percent). However, the gaps are even wider for specific groups
in the labour force, including young and old people, women and the lower edu-
cated.
Despite the fact that the EU members have been hit by similar shocks
like oil price hikes, the performance of national labour markets has been quite
heterogeneous. While some countries experienced a temporary deterioration in
their unemployment prospects, the shocks had long lasting impacts in other
countries. For example, the UK experienced high unemployment rates in the
1980s, but they have been markedly fallen since then. Germany has changed
from a country with very low unemployment to a position slightly above the
EU average. The unemployment rate in Spain declined from 20 per cent in the
beginning of the 1990s to numbers well below 10 per cent in recent years. In
some smaller countries like Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands, unem-
ployment has been reduced to a relatively low level.
To some extent, the labour market record might be caused by the insti-
tutional framework. Institutions are important since they define the rules of
the game under which private households and firms operate. On the one
hand, rigid institutions can prolong the adjustment period and may lead to
persistence, see Eichengreen and Iversen (1999) and Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000). On the other hand, they can introduce a higher degree of stability into
labour market relationships, which can be an advantage especially in periods
of economic downturns. However, the process of market integration and the
loss of instruments for national policies have put severe pressure on the insti-
tutional setting. In this respect, regulation measures should be adaptable to
rapidly changing technologies in product markets and increasing heterogene-
ity of the labour force. 
Several papers have investigated whether differences in the perform-
ance of national labour markets can be linked to the institutional framework.
Overall, the results are not very conclusive. Only certain aspects of the insti-
tutional framework seem to be relevant, while others did not show the expect-
ed sign or are not significant at all. For example, Nickell (1997), Layard and
Nickell (1999) and Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005) have stressed the role
of the social security system to move people from welfare to work. In contrast,
institutions like employment protection and minimum wages do not seem rel-
evant to explain the unemployment experience. Other authors have empha-
sized the importance of the latter institutions, see Blanchard and Portugal
(2001) in case of employment protection and duration of unemployment ben-
efits, and Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2001, 2002), where high employment lev-
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els are associated with flexible wage structures and a high wage dispersion.
This paper extends the previous literature in various respects. First, a
different endogenous variable is used, which is better suited to measure the
adjustment capabilities of national labour markets. Since the deterioration in
unemployment is primarily caused by shortages in labour demand, this rela-
tionship defines the point of departure (Bean, 1994). Specifically, the elastici-
ties of labour demand are considered, as they represent the strength of the
employment reaction to a changing economic environment. Output and real
wage elasticities are estimated per country by means of recursive techniques.
As time series of elasticities are available per country, the impact of institu-
tions on the elasticities can be examined in a panel setting. This approach
allows to disentangle the institutional effect from other sociodemographic
characteristics, which are bounded in the fixed effects.
Second, not only labour, but also product market institutions are rele-
vant for the labour market. Several studies have emphasized that both prod-
uct and labour market institutions are crucial for the labour market perform-
ance, see Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Berger and Danninger (2005) and
Boeri (2005). To save degrees of freedom, a summary indicator describing the
state of product market regulation is used. In case this regressor is neglected,
the evidence on labour market institutions might be seriously flawed. Third,
updated OECD indicators describing the institutional framework are used,
which were not available in the former studies. Therefore, the analysis also
provides insights in the usefulness of these indicators.
The results suggest that more flexibility in product and labour markets
and higher incentives for households to work could be appropriate strategies
to improve the labour market record. The employment response to changing
conditions is stronger in more deregulated environments. Compared to the
current state of the economy, more deregulation in labour markets could relief
the absorption capabilities to shocks. This also underpins the usefulness of
the OECD regulation indicators. On the other hand, the optimal degree of flex-
ibility is certainly not infinite. Appropriate reform strategies need to take the
European social model into account.
The paper is organized as follows. A standard labour demand relation-
ship is derived from cost minimization behaviour of firms (section 2). Results
of the literature concerning the institutional impact are reviewed in section 3.
Section 4 holds the cointegration analysis for the variables entering the labour
demand equation and presents output and real wage elasticities per country.
The impacts of institutions on these measures are examined in section 5.
Section 6 offers a conclusion. The data involved in the study are described in
detail in an appendix.
2. LABOUR DEMAND BEHAVIOUR
According to standard economic theory, profit maximizing firms are faced by
output demand and factor prices, which are both exogeneous (Hammermesh,
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1993). As a result of duality, optimal behavior can be inferred from the analy-
sis of the cost function. Cost minimizing labour and capital input quantities
are obtained by taking the partial derivatives of total costs with respect to the
factor prices (Shephard’s lemma). Using a log linear approximation, optimal
labour demand L* can be stated as
where Y is output, w the real wage, and r the real rental price of capital. Prices
are measured in real terms, implying that the output price moves in line with
nominal factor prices. Technological progress T is assumed to be Hicks-neu-
tral and proxied by a linear time trend. The parameters β, δ and θ denote the
elasticities of labour demand to output, wages and capital prices, respective-
ly. Higher demand for goods will raise labour input, while an increase in rela-
tive factor prices — either due to a rise in wages or a fall in the rental price of
capital — will lower it. Due to imperfections such as institutional or cost
restrictions, adjustment to the economic environment may not be instante-
neous. Actual employment only partially reacts
to the level desired by firms. The higher the degree of persistence λ, the lower
the employment response in the short run. By substituting the labour demand
function into (2), an error correction mechanism
is implied, which can be enhanced by a more complex dynamic structure. The
long run equilibrium is captured by a cointegrating relationship and can be
inferred from (3). If ΔL=0, actual and optimal employment coincide. The coin-
tegration parameters are the elasticities to be examined.
3. THE ROLE OF PRODUCT AND LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS
Institutions are of key importance for a smooth working of laabor markets, see
Agell (1999), Bertola (2004) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005). For
example, in-formation asymmetries between workers and firms or different
degrees of market power might require an appropriate mix of the regulation
framework. But institutions may also introduce rigidities which may protract
the reallocation of labour in response to shocks, and overly restrictive ele-
ments might worsen the employment performance. To examine this issue, a
set of variables has been developed in the literature, which cover several
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aspects of regulation in product and labour markets, including entrance bar-
riers to firms, the tax burden and transfers, employment protection legisla-
tion, the wage bargaining structure and active labour market policies.
Often the institutional impact is not clear on theoretical grounds and
has to be determined empirically. For example, stronger employment protec-
tion legislation may foster the bargaining power of workers in the wage nego-
tiations, while the unemployed cannot exert much downward pressure, see
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991). As a consequence, wages are above equi-
librium and the level of employment is lower. But investments in firm-specif-
ic human capital might be supported and can generate long run productivity
and competitiveness gains (Belot and Van Ours, 2002). Employment protec-
tion can also work as a substitute for incomplete unemployment insurance,
see Boeri, Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2003). Active labour market policies could
improve the skills of the unemployed, especially for the low qualified, but can
also crowd out regular labour, as firms have the incentive to hire subsidized
workers, see Calmfors, Forslund and Hemström (2002).
According to Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), adverse supply shocks like
the oil crises cannot explain the divergence in the national labour market per-
formance, as there is insufficient heterogeneity in these shocks. Institutions
can account for these differences, but many of them were already in place
when unemployment was low. However, interactions between shocks and
institutions may explain the development, as the reallocation of labour in
response to shocks can be prolonged. Therefore, researchers have controlled
for interactions between institutions and shocks, and also between the compo-
nents of the institutional setting, emphazising the relevance of the regulatory
mix, see Daveri and Tabellini (2000), Belot and Van Ours (2001) and Mourre
(2004). For example, the presence of unemployment benefits and employment
protection can amplify the effects on the unemployment rate.
Overall, the empirical evidence is far from conclusive, see Aidt and
Tzannatos (2002), Baker, Glyn, Howell and Schmitt (2002) and Arpaia and
Mourre (2005) for recent surveys. Shocks seem to have larger and more per-
sistent effects in countries with a stricter regulation framework, see Blanchard
and Wolfers (2000) and Fitoussi, Jestaz, Phelps and Zoega (2000). According
to Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2001), the interaction of de-mographic as well as
macroeconomic shocks and labour market institutions is crucial to explain
the shift of the US from a country with relatively high to low unemployment
rates. By contrast, Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005) did not find any empir-
ical evi-dence for the interaction hypothesis.
Other papers have focused on key elements of the institutional setup.
Employment protection legislation seems to have no impact on unemployment
(Nickell, 1997, Nickell and Layard, 1999, Belot and Van Ours, 2001). As
employment protection affects the duration of unemployment periods and
worker flows in an opposite direction, the net effect can be ambigious
(Blanchard and Portugal, 2001). The impact of dismissal costs might also
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depend on the state of the business cycle (Chen, Snower and Zoega, 2002).
Strong trade unions tend to raise unemployment, see Elmeskov, Martin and
Scarpetta (1998). However this effect is compensated if wage bargaining is
highly centralized. If unions are important, a more compressed wage structure
emerges and employment chances are worsened in particular for the unskilled
and young (Kahn, 2000). On the other hand, the likelihood of attending school
increases, as education bears lower opportunity costs.
By comparing the actual outcome with a model assuming fixed institu-
tions over time, Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel and Quintini (2002) are able to
explain half of the unemployment experience by institutional shifts, especial-
ly in the tax and transfer system, during the 1960-95 period. However, this
finding is based on high levels of endogeneous per-sistence as reflected by the
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. The persistence should be caused
by institutions, but is left unexplained in the model. The importance of the tax
and transfer system for the decision of households to work has also been
stressed by Mourre (2004).
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LABOUR DEMAND
Labour demand analysis is carried out using the annual data taken from the
AMECO database of the EU Commission. The sample covers the EU countries,
where Greece and the new member states have been excluded due to a lack of
data. Luxembourg has been pooled with Belgium, using GDP weights. Overall,
the development in 13 countries is observed over the 1973-2003 period. Time
series for each country are obtained for employment, real GDP, real compen-
sation per employee and real interest rates. Real GDP, compensation and
interest rates serve as proxies for output, the real wage, and the rental price
of capital, respectively. As the latter turned out to be largely insignificant in
the subsequent analysis, the results refer to the three variable system
(employment, output and real wage). Exact variable definitions are given in the
appendix. The series enter the analysis in logs.
As the variables entering the labour demand equation might be non-
stationary, their integration and cointegration properties have to be examined.
ADF and KPSS tests are used to check for a unit root in the individual time
series (see Table 1). The lag length of the ADF regressions is determined using
Campbell and Perron’s general-to-simple procedure (1991). The estimator of
the long run residual variance needed for the KPSS statis-tics is obtained by
the Bartlett kernel and the automatic bandwidth parameter approach sug-
gested by Newey and West (1994). All variables include a constant and a lin-
ear time trend in levels and a constant in first differences.
As a rule, the ADF test cannot reject the null of a unit root for the lev-
els, but for the first differences. The evidence based on the KPSS test is not in
opposite with these findings. Nevertheless, there are some exceptions. For
example, employment in Finland seems to be stationary already in the level,
and output nonstationary even in the first difference representation. However,
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a same order of integration across countries relieves the inter-pretation of the
results. Thus, the variables are seen to be integrated of order 1, i.e. non-sta-
tionary in their levels and stationary in first differences.
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AT
BL
DK
FI
FR
GY
IR
IT
NL
PO
SP
SW
UK
ADF
-2.339 -3.034*
-2.869 -2.947*
-2.823 -3.592*
-3.658* -3.247*
-1.950    -2.630   
-2.294 -4.997*
-1.176 -2.065
KPSS
0.155* 0.205
0.156* 0.308
0.062 0.099
0.089 0.099
0.146* 0.267
0.110 0.130
0.168* 0.391
KPSS
0.121 0.138
0.149* 0.413
0.169* 0.287
0.166* 0.400
0.124 0.137
0.100 0.107
ADF
-2.440 -2.988*
-1.421 -5.064*
-2.353 -3.665*
-1.504     -2.625  
-2.842     -1.836
-2.497 -4.762*
Table 1: Unit root tests of labour demand variables
Employment
AT
BL
DK
FI
FR
GY
IR
IT
NL
PO
SP
SW
UK
ADF
-2.527 -6.150*
-2.855 -6.545*
-2.344 -5.134*
-3.067 -2.614  
-2.504 -3.716*
-2.226 -3.732*
-0.225 -3.039*
KPSS
0.082 0.064
0.108 0.068
0.125 0.156
0.092 0.088
0.093 0.096
0.089 0.130
KPSS
0.170* 0.374
0.156* 0.160
0.059 0.075
0.125 0.132
0.071 0.103
0.123 0.228
ADF
-1.243 -6.219*
-2.333   -2.719
-5.634* -4.492*
-3.026 -2.993*
-4.259* -3.408*
-3.123 -4.123*
Output
AT
BL
DK
FI
FR
GY
IR
IT
NL
PO
SP
SW
UK
ADF
-4.011* -2.836
-3.061 -3.927*
-2.286 -6.241*
-2.173 -4.722*
-5.062* -2.913
-3.481 -6.806*
-3.474 -5.153*
KPSS
0.107 0.376
0.160* 0.374
0.140 0.129
0.180* 0.368
0.169* 0.518*
0.148* 0.331
KPSS
0.169* 0.550*
0.081 0.209
0.119 0.143
0.157* 0.484*
0.159* 0.213
0.124 0.153
ADF
-1.947 -4.527*
-2.273 -3.141*
-2.872 -3.596*
-2.490 -2.566
-0.541 -4.397*
-1.517 -4.114*
Real wages
AT=Austria, BL=Belgium (+Luxembourg) DK=Denmark, FI=Finland, FR=France,
GY=Germany, IR=Ireland, IT= Italy, NL=Netherlands, PO=Portugal, SP=Spain, SW=Sweden,
UK=United Kingdom. The first (second) column in the ADF or KPSS section refers to the level
(differenced) series. Level variables include a constant and a linear trend, and variables in
differences a constant. A * indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of nonstationarity
(ADF) or stationarity (KPSS) at least on the 0.05 level of significance. The ADF (KPSS) criti-
cal value at the 0.05 percent level is -3.574 (0.146) for the model in levels and -2.972 (0.463)
for the model in first dfifferences.
Because of the nonstationarities of the variables involved, a cointegra-
tion analysis is the way to proceed. The results of the Johansen (1991) trace
test are shown in Table 2. The trace statistic evaluates the null of no cointe-
gration against the alternative of at most one cointegration vector. The lag
orders of the VARs have been determined by the Schwartz criterion, where a
maximum of 2 periods is considered. This corresponds to a 3-year lag in the
level representation. All models include an unrestricted constant. The null of
no cointegration is rejected for all countries. Thus, the variables in the labour
demand func-tion are cointegrated.
In principle, the cointegration vector can be also derived from the
Johansen procedure. However, this is not recommended. In fact, whether or
not the cointegrating relationship can be interpreted in terms of an equation
explaining labour demand can be inferred from a conditional error correction
model. This approach may lead to constant coefficients even if a shift is pres-
ent in the reduced form. Given the identification problems in full systems, a
structural model for an individual variable might be easier to develop using
the single equation context. To avoid the well known deficits arising from OLS
estimation, efficient techniques are used, see Saikkonen (1991) and Hendry
(1995). In a dynamic setting, the long run equation is augmented by lead and
lagged differences of the regressors to control for endogeneous feedback.
Lagged differences in the dependent variable are also involved in case that the
residuals exhibit serial correlation. In this context, the relevance of the indi-
vidual regressors can be inferred using conventional statistics.
Country specific elasticities for labour demand are shown in Table 3. As
a result of the unification, a break occurs in the German time series in 1991,
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AT
BL
DK
FI
FR
GY
IR
Lag           Trace
1 44.006*
1 43.282*
1 37.064*
2 44.896*
2 55.500*
2 63.048*
1 44.216*
IT
NL
PO
SP
SW
UK
Lag          Trace
1 40.364*
1 65.022*
2 43.361*
1 40.836*
2 43.627*
1 57.987*
Table 2: Cointegration tests for labour demand variables
AT=Austria, BL=Belgium (+Luxembourg) DK=Denmark, FI=Finland, FR=France,
GY=Germany, IR=Ireland, IT= Italy, NL=Netherlands, PO=Portugal, SP=Spain, SW=Sweden,
UK=United Kingdom. The lag length of the underly-ing VAR in levels is reported. All models
include an unrestricted constant, i.e. the linear trend is not restricted to the cointegration
relationship. A * indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at least on
the 0.05 level of significance. Critical values are from MacKinnon, Haug, and Michelis
(1999). The 0.05 percent critical value is 29.797.
which has been removed by impulse and step dummies. Due to space con-
straints, stationary terms in the regressions have been suppressed. All vari-
ables are estimated with the expected signs, implying that a standard labour
demand equation is valid for the EU economies. In the majority of cases, the
output elasticity does not significantly differ from 1. Real wage elasticities are
lower than output elasticities in absolute value, but show stronger variation
across the member states. Technological progress contributes to a decline in
labour demand by roughly 1.5 per cent per year in most countries. The equa-
tions are well behaved accord-ing to standard specification tests. For example,
the residuals are neither heteroscedastic nor autocorrelated.
5. INSTITUTIONAL IMPACT ON LABOUR DEMAND
Labour market institutions refer to employment protection legislation, the
structure of the wage bargaining process, the tax and transfer system and
active labour market policies. Product market regulation is also included and
measured by a summary index.
Institutions for wage negotiations are proxied by trade union densities,
the coverage of wages bargained by unions, and the degree of
coordination/centralization at which bargaining actually takes place. Taxes
and transfers are defined in terms of the benefits available to the unemployed
and the tax wedge on labour income. Public employment services and labour
market training are used as a substitute for active labour market policies.
Data on labour market institutions are mostly taken from the OECD (2004)
employment outlook.
The degree of product market regulation refers to seven non-manufac-
turing industries. These sectors are typically less open for international com-
petition, and the institutional framework might be more important here. The
OECD summary indicator covers different dimensions like public ownership of
firms, entry regulation, market structure, vertical integration and price con-
trols (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006). Exact variable definitions are given in the
appendix.
Institutional indicators are the regressors to explain output and real
wage elasticities. However, a model with constant elasticities would inevitably
lead to a cross-section analysis, where the institutional impact cannot be sep-
arated from other country characteristics. In general, a panel approach is
superior, where unobserved heterogeneity is bounded in the fixed effects.
To develop a panel structure, labour demand elasticities are allowed to
vary over time. Although the elasticities reported in Table 3 are fairly stable,
they show some (possibly insignificant) variation, if the equations are consid-
ered over subperiods. Time varying elasticities are estimated using dynamic
OLS recursively. Initially, all the equations are run over the 1973-1985 peri-
od, and the first set of parameters (corresponding to 1985) is computed. Then,
the period is prolonged by 1, and the process is repeated until the end of the
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sample is reached. The panel fixed effects models are based on annual data
covering the 1985-2003 period, because estimates of labour demand elastici-
ties are not available earlier.2
In principle, there may be endogeneous feedback, as the labour market
performance can affect the institutional pattern. Hence, the regressions have
been also estimated with lagged indicators as intruments for the current state
of regulation. Since the effects on the results are largely neglectable, a simul-
taneity bias does not occur. The labour market outcome might affect the insti-
tutional pattern, but this relationship is hardly a contem-poraneous one
(Blanchard, 2005).
As institutions adjust only slowly, the correlation between the regres-
sors is usually high. This leads to imprecise estimates of the institutional
impact, even in the context of fixed effects models. To get some insights into
the robustness of the results, equations cover-ing different aspects of the reg-
ulation framework are considered. In particular, individual models are pre-
sented for employment protection legislation (I), wage bargaining (II), the tax
and transfer system (III), active labour market policies (IV), and product mar-
ket regulation (V), see the tables 4 and 5 for the output and the real wage elas-
ticity, respectively. The models are optimal from a statistical point of view, i.e.
only signifi-cant or marginal significant variables are allowed to enter. Optimal
nested models (VI) are shown in the right hand column of each table. It should
be noted, that most indica-tors are measured on a rank scale. Hence, only the
sign, but not the size of the coeffi-cients should be interpreted.
As a general result, the regulation framework measured by the indica-
tors is important to explain aggregated labour demand behavior in the EU. The
signs of the institutional impact have sensible interpretations.
In particular, stronger employment protection legislation will lead to a
decline in the output elasticity, as the costs to firms to adjust labour input
over the business cycle tend to increase (I). Dismissals are more difficult and
firms are more cautious about filling vacancies. The significance of the
employment protection index is in sharp contrast to the bulk of the literature,
where almost no impacts have been detected so far, see for example Layard
and Nickell (1999) and Belot and Van Ours (2004). Furthermore, a stronger
presence of unions and centralization of the wage bargaining process dampen
the employment reaction to output shocks (II). This effect is partly compen-
sated in countries where wages negotiated by unions spread over the various
sectors of the economy, thereby reinforcing the findings of previous studies
like Mourre (2004) and Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005).
An increase in the tax wedge or in unemployment benefits reduces the
distance between labour income and transfers. Therefore, households have
less incentives to work and the reaction to output changes should decline.
However, both variables for the tax and transfer system appear to be insignif-
icant at the 0.05 level (III). Although the variables in isolation do not dominate,
the interaction with the degree of product market regulation is important. The
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tax wedge exerts a negative effect on the elasticity in highly regulated
economies. The evidence from other studies is not conclusive on this point.
While the tax wedge worsens the employment performance according to
Mourre (2004), it is insignificant in the analysis of Belot and Van Ours (2004).
According to Nickell, Nun-ziata, Quintini and Ochel, an rise in the tax wedge
will raise unemployment, especially in countries with a high degree of bar-
gaining coordination.
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Constant
EPL
DEN
COV
COO
CEN
BRR
TAX
TAX*PMR
PES
LMT
PMR
R2
1.903
(0.102)
-0.780
(0.097)
1.655
(0.393)
-0.457
(0.101)
-2.185
(0.358)
1.386
(0.377)
-0.181
(0.056)
1.779
(0.458)
0.603
(0.400)
-2.636
(0.374)
2.499
(0.403)
-0.158
(0.058)
1.321
(0.056)
-0.172
(0.024)
0.498
(0.091)
2.236
(0.459)
0.293
(0.113)
1.328
(0.060)
-0.096
(0.014)
0.731          0.748          0.716         0.696         0.710         0.797
BRR=benefit replacement rate. EPL=employment protection legislation, DEN=trade union
density, COV=bargaining coverage, COO=bargaining coordination, CEN=bargaining cen-
tralization, LMT=labour market training measures, PMR=product market regulation,
PMS=public employment services, TAX=tax wedge. R2=adjusted R-squared, standard
errors in parantheses.
I              II             III             IV            V              VI
Table 4: Impact of institutions on output elasticity
Active labour market policies show a positive effect on the output elas-
ticity (IV). These measures tend to improve the qualifications of the labour
force, especially in the low productivity segment, and a human capital effect
may increase the reaction. Again, this finding is not uncontroversial, as
Mourre (2004) did not detect an impact of active labour market policies on the
labour market performance. Finally, the effect of output on employment is
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Constant
EPL
DEN
COV
COO
CEN
BRR
TAX
TAX*PMR
PES
LMT
PMR
R2
-0.830
(0.113)
0.517
(0.091)
-0.240
(0.232)
2.015
(0.286)
-1.020
(0.298)
0.082
(0.019)
-0.785
(0.374)
-0.299
(0.088)
0.597
(0.331)
1.927
(0.346)
-1.616
(0.366)
-0.107
(0.042)
-0.564
(0.048)
0.168
(0.021)
0.134
(0.091)
-1.160
(0.373)
-0.463
(0.092)
-0.572
(0.052)
0.094
(0.012)
0.623          0.667    0.665               0.695         0.657         0.798
I              II             III             IV            V              VI
Table 5: Impact of institutions on real wage elasticity
BRR=benefit replacement rate. EPL=employment protection legislation, DEN=trade union
density, COV=bargaining coverage, COO=bargaining coordination, CEN=bargaining central-
ization, LMT=labour market training measures, PMR=product market regulation, PMS=pub-
lic employment services, TAX=tax wedge. R2=adjusted R-squared, standard errors in paran-
theses.
lower in countries with highly regulated product markets (V). Because of mul-
ticollinearity problems, not all regressors remain significant if the models are
merged to a nested specification (VI). Only labour market institutions seem to
be impor-tant to explain the employment response.
The directions of impacts are reversed if the real wage elasticity is con-
sidered. Here, a positive sign actually raises the real wage elasticity, i.e. the
parameter declines in absolute value. Thus the real wage becomes less impor-
tant for employment. In particular, an increase in the strength of employment
protection is expected to reduce the response to shocks in the real wage, pos-
sibly due to higher insider power. This interpretation is supported when indi-
cators for wage setting behaviour are analysed. The more regulated the bar-
gaining process, the lower the ability of firms to readjust the level of employ-
ment to wage fluctuations. Union densities and coordination of wage negotia-
tions appear to be most important, while bargaining coverage shows a com-
pensating effect. Taxes and transfers raise the elasticity in countries where
product markets are highly regulated. Active labour market policies exert a
negative effect. They may act as a buffer to the regular labour market, and a
higher availability of these measures enables firms to adjust labour input eas-
ier. Finally, the employment response to real wage shocks is lower in more
regulated product markets.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the role of institutions for labour market performance is inves-
tigated using a panel of EU countries. The starting point of the analysis is the
labour demand function, which is expressed by its structural parameters,
such as the elasticities of employment to output and factor prices.
Institutional variables include employment protection legislation, the struc-
ture of wage bargaining, measures of the tax and transfer system, active
labour market policies and an overall indicator describing the degree of prod-
uct market regulation.
The analysis shows that standard labour demand equations can be jus-
tified for the EU countries. The variables of the labour demand function are
cointegrated, and the long run elasticities are estimated with the expected
signs. Furthermore, labour market institutions are important to explain the
response of employment to output and real wage shocks. The findings have
sensible interpretations, emphasizing that the employment reaction to the
macroeconomic conditions is stronger in more deregulated environment. In
contrast to the bulk of the literature, a strong impact of employment protec-
tion legislation is obtained. Moreover, the tax wedge appears to be highly rel-
evant, but only in countries with a high degree of product market regulation.
Given that labour markets need to be more flexible in the process of EU
integration, policies should introduce more deregulation in the product and
labour markets to ensure a smooth adjustment to shocks while avoiding per-
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sistence effects. However, the optimal degree of flexibility is certainly not infi-
nite, and appropriate reform strategies need to take the European social model
into account.
Date of acceptance: 8 August 2008
APPENDIX
The sample runs from 1973-2003, using annual data from 13 EU member states (Aus-
tria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portu-
gal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom). The series for Belgium includes Luxembourg.
GDP and employment refer to the sum of the figures in these two countries, and fac-
tor prices have been aggregated using real GDP weights.
All macroeconomic data have been taken from the AMECO database of the EU
Com-mission (http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators_en.htm).
Country-by-country time series are obtained for employment in persons, GDP at mar-
ket prices, labour compensation per employee, long term nominal interest rates, and
the GDP deflator (1995=100). Nominal GDP and compensation per employee are deflat-
ed by GDP prices to compute the real variables used in the analysis. The real interest
rate is proxied as the difference between the long term interest rate and annual infla-
tion in GDP prices. Apart from real interest rates, all series enter the analysis in logs.
The bulk of the institutional data have been taken from the OECD (2004)
employment outlook, chapters 2 and 3, available at www.oecd.org. Institutional data
are considered for the 1985-2003 period.
Some institutional variables, including employment protection legislation, bar-
gaining coordination and centralization are measured on a rank scale where a higher
number refers to stronger regulation. For example, bargaining coordination is scaled in
the [1;5] interval, where 1 is bargaining at firm level, with no coordination by higher-
level asso-ciations, and 5 is coordination by top-level confederations of unions and
employers' associations where even the government can impose a wage freeze. Other
variables are quantitative. Trade union densities show the share of workers organized
in unions. The rate of workers governed by unionized contracts is measured by bar-
gaining coverage. Benefit replacement rates are obtained as a percentage of earnings
before tax, averaged over family types. The tax wedge refers to the sum of the rates of
employment taxes, social contributions and indirect taxes. The two categories of active
labour market poli-cies, public employment services and labour market training are
expressed as expenditure shares in nominal GDP. The index for product market regu-
lation comprises the informa-tion of seven non-manufacturing industries, including
telecommunication, electricity, gas, post, rail, air passenger transport and road freight.
Data have been taken from Conway and Nicoletti (2006).
Some of the institutional data are unavailable at the annual frequency.The OECD
(2004) reports 5-yearly or 10-yearly data for employment protection legislation, coverage,
co-ordination and centralization. In these cases, the database is extended to match the an-
nual frequency. Intermediate values for employment protection of regular and temporary
work have been calculated using the OECD (2004) table 2.A2.6, in which information on
the timing of the reforms in this variable is provided for the past 20 years. Measures of the
bargaining process were interpolated using the Nickell and Nunziata (2001) database.
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ENDNOTES
1. Buscher, Institute for Economic Research Halle (IWH); Dreger (corresponding
author), German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), cdreger@diw.de; Ramos,
University of Barcelona, Grup d’Anàlisi Quantitativa Regional (AQR); Surinach,
University of Barcelona, Grup d'Anàlisi Quantitativa Regional (AQR). The results pre-
sented here were obtained under the EU working contract The contribution of wage de-
velopments to labour market performance (ECFIN-C/2003/001). We would like to the
staff from the DG ECFIN of the EU Commission and especially Michael Thiel. The
authors thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. The usual
disclaimer applies.
2. As a check for robustness, rolling regressions have been performed with a fixed
length of observations. The results turn out to be broadly stable and can be obtained
from the authors upon request.
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